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1. Introduction 
The standard life-cycle model predicts that households should accumulate assets while working, and 
decumulate these assets to fund consumption spending in retirement. Recent economic research has 
identified certain stylised facts about saving that seem puzzling within this benchmark. One strand of 
literature has discussed the “retirement savings puzzle” (Banks et al., 1998) that households seem to 
experience a discrete drop, rather than a smooth change, in consumption at the time they retire. A 
second puzzle is the fact that households seem to demand assets that commit them to lock away their 
funds for fixed periods of time, even though such commitment reduces the opportunity to use wealth 
in times of unexpected “rainy day” need. A third fact that standard models cannot easily explain is the 
relatively slow rate at which older households seem to decumulate wealth, with some retirees even 
continuing to save (see Attanasio and Weber, 2010, for a review of this and other puzzles.)  
To the previous (by no means exhaustive) list, we may add the issue that elderly households seem 
reluctant to utilise their housing wealth to fund spending even when they appear “house rich but cash 
poor”. Evidence on this in European (SHARE) data is provided by Angelini et al. (2009), which 
documents the extent to which a failure to downsize (or otherwise draw on) housing wealth is related 
to financial difficulties among the old. Furthermore, the issue runs deeper than a “no downsizing 
puzzle”: Angelini et al. (2014) explore the determinants of home purchase past age fifty and the 
evidence indicates that some households increase their housing wealth, or become first-time house 
buyers, even around or just after the time of retirement. This is particularly surprising because the 
evidence refers to continental European countries where eviction and rent risks are quite low for sitting 
tenants (Angelini et al., 2011). 
Many different ways to explain puzzles such as those listed above have been suggested. As highlighted 
by Attanasio and Weber (2010), non-standard preferences, such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
(Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) or temptation and self-control preferences (Gul and 
Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004; Bucciol, 2012), may explain a taste for commitment in investment decisions 
and so contribute to the explanation of several apparent puzzles. The aim of this paper is, using 
European data, to investigate the empirical support for the idea that temptation, and a consequent taste 
for commitment, may be important in shaping households’ saving and wealth allocation decisions. As 
we describe below, our interest is particularly in the choices about home-ownership. 
Understanding how and why individuals make the saving and investment decisions that they do is of 
interest for both academic audiences and pensions practitioners. Understanding the reasons why 
individuals choose to own their home and largely fail to reduce housing equity in the last years of their 
life, is also an interesting research agenda for economists and social scientists (Venti and Wise, 2004; 
Angelini et al., 2014) and has important policy implications in ageing societies.  
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We are particularly interested in understanding whether temptation preferences, which can plausibly 
help to explain other consumption-saving puzzles, might also help explain observed relationships 
between patterns of investment in illiquid financial assets, and in housing. The idea that temptation and 
a desire for commitment might influence lifecycle patterns of home ownership is also taken up in a very 
recent contribution by Kovacs (2016); her simulations show that as housing becomes more illiquid (and 
even without an interaction with illiquid financial assets) this can lead tempted agents to increase the 
amount of housing that they own from early middle age onwards. Related research on non-standard 
preferences and housing comes from Ghent (2015), who looks at the implications of hyperbolic 
discounting for home-ownership rates and welfare in a model in which the interest rate is determined 
by credit market equilibrium. Regarding the failure to spend down housing wealth in old-age, Nakajima 
and Telyukova (2011) provide a survey of several possible explanations and an impressive, detailed 
analysis of home equity release in old age in a rich life-cycle model under uncertainty. Our empirical 
focus is different from these other papers. Furthermore, we believe that our approach of looking 
whether home-buying decisions, and their relationship to the purchase of illiquid assets, can support 
the hypotheses that temptation and a taste for commitment importantly shape behaviour, is entirely 
novel.      
Temptation preferences give a high value to the commitment property of illiquid assets such as 
retirement assets or housing: since illiquid wealth cannot be disinvested immediately, agents cannot 
succumb to the temptation to spend it on current consumption. Removing this temptation can make 
agents better-off as they face lower self-control costs in trying to implement optimal forward-looking 
consumption and saving plans. Tempted individuals – who typically face a no-unsecured-borrowing 
condition that prevents them from falling into heavy debt early in life – look for ways to tie their hands, 
for example through holding illiquid assets. After retirement (once retirement accounts enter the 
decumulation phase), housing is the main (or often the only) illiquid asset that families can still choose 
to invest in. If temptation is a key driver of saving decisions, and particularly decisions about retirement 
savings, then this should affect households’ decisions about how much to invest in illiquid financial 
assets and in housing.  
We look for prima facie evidence for the role of housing wealth as a commitment device by using 
micro-data to investigate whether individuals who engage in financial activities that help to control 
temptation, are subsequently more likely than others to become home owners. In particular, we look at 
whether individuals who engage in long-term saving plans by investing in individual retirement 
accounts and/or life-insurance policies, then have an increased likelihood of investing in housing. In 
Section 2 we outline a theoretical model to better justify our claim that our empirical work provides an 
indication of a role for temptation preferences. To carry out our empirical analyses, we need a 
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household-level dataset containing information on holdings of illiquid financial assets and of housing: 
an ideal dataset is SHARE, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Using this panel 
dataset we observe over the lifetime behaviour regarding holding and accumulation of the relevant 
assets, and we are able to relate this behaviour to characteristics such as education and risk attitude, as 
well as demographic and economic variables. 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to understand how the decision to purchase a house for the first 
time is related to the holding of illiquid financial assets (retirement accounts and life insurance policies) 
that can be seen as ways to tie one’s hands (commitment devices). We perform a discrete-time duration 
analysis through a logit regression model. This allows us to estimate the hazard rate of first-time house 
purchase, conditional on the ownership of illiquid financial assets and a number of observable 
characteristics, including a measure of permanent income. Given that ownership of illiquid financial 
assets may proxy for differences in unobserved characteristics, we also allow for unobserved 
heterogeneity by means of a bivariate mixed proportional hazard model with shared frailty, and check 
how the relationship between becoming a homeowner and the ownership of illiquid financial assets 
varies across the population of interest. We explain in detail in Section 4 why we believe our empirical 
models are appropriate for the question at hand, and to the best of our knowledge we are the first to 
employ this hazard model, with unobserved heterogeneity, in the context of house-purchase decisions. 
To briefly anticipate, we find that even controlling for many possible motives for purchasing housing, 
and for unobserved heterogeneity, individuals are seen to become significantly more likely to buy 
housing after investing in illiquid assets; this finding is consistent with the predictions of a model with 
illiquid financial assets, housing and temptation preferences. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sketches a theoretical framework for the 
temptation motive with housing and illiquid assets; Section 3 describes the data; Sections 4 comments 
on the parameter estimates of the duration model with and without unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. A theoretical framework 
In this section we describe a lifecycle consumption-savings model with two types of illiquid asset (a 
financial asset and housing), and temptation preferences. The purpose of the discussion is to formalise 
implications of the model which we can then look for in the data.  
The economic framework consists of a life-cycle model in which time is discrete and t  denotes adult 
age. An agent lives for a maximum of T  periods: K  as a worker and T K  as a retiree. For the sake 
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of simplicity, the retirement age K  is taken to be exogenous. At any age t , individuals face a fixed 
probability   of surviving until the next period. Death is certain at the beginning of period 1T  . 
At every point in time t, an individual has to choose non-durable consumption 0tC  , contribution 
0tX   (if t K ) or withdrawal 0tX   (if t K ) from an illiquid retirement asset, and housing 
tenure, 0,1tH  . Choices are conditional on cash-on-hand (liquid personal wealth plus disposable 
income), tS , and the size of the retirement asset, tA , at the beginning of time t, and housing tenure in 
the previous period, 1tH  . The housing tenure variable is an indicator for renting  0tH   or owning 
 1tH   the home. 
 
2.1. Assets 
Agents may hold liquid and illiquid financial assets throughout their life. Liquid assets are personal 
savings. Illiquid assets are the savings accumulated in retirement plans, which generally have the 
following features: i) contributions are possible in any period before retirement age; ii) contributions are 
matched by the employer; iii) contributions are tax deductible; iv) withdrawals from the account 
balance are always granted after retirement, and only in exceptional cases before retirement. In this 
stylised model, we capture features (ii) and (iii) by assumptions about the rate of return (see next 
paragraph). To make the retirement asset an effective commitment device during the working life, 
features (i) and (iv) are particularly important and we capture these by assuming that contributions are 
always possible for agents of working age ( t K ), while withdrawals are only possible at ages t K , 
once the pensionable age is reached.  
For the sake of simplicity we assume that returns on assets are certain. Both personal (S) and retirement 
(A) assets are invested in a diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds, and safe assets that accumulates at a 
given market rate of return. However, before retirement age effective returns for the individual on 
retirement assets are higher than returns on liquid assets ( A SR R  if t K ) because of employer 
matching and tax deductions. As a result, workers face a trade-off: on the one hand they have the 
incentive to save in illiquid assets because of their higher returns but, on the other, they have a 
disincentive to do so because their savings will not be available until retirement. 
In what follows we use tA  to denote the retirement account consisting of all the savings in illiquid 
assets made up to year t , including their returns, and use tS  to denote the personal account consisting 
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of earnings in year t  and all the savings in liquid assets made up to year t , including their returns. The 
personal account thus includes all the wealth immediately available for consumption, or cash-on-hand. 
Given current asset holdings, tS  and tA , and housing tenure, 1tH  , at time t  the agent determines the 
optimal level of consumption, 0tC  , housing tenure, 0,1tH  , as well as the contribution 
to/withdrawal from the retirement account, tX . Here 
0 if ;
0 if .
t
t
X t K
X t K
 
   
The evolution of the illiquid retirement account is given by 
 1t A t tA R A X    
with 1 0tA   . Anything left after consumption and changes to housing tenure and the retirement 
account, is saved in the personal account. The evolution of this liquid personal account is then given by 
     1 1 -1 11 1t S t t t t t t t t t tS R S C X PH PH H H PH P H Y                
with 1 0tS   , i.e., borrowing is not possible. The parameter P indicates the house price, while   
denotes a transaction cost proportional to the house price that is applied when selling a house. The 
absolute value -1t tH H  is equal to 1 when there is a change in home tenure  1t tH H   and 0 
otherwise. In addition, in every time period the home-owner spends a fraction  0,1   of the house 
value on maintenance and repairs (as in Li and Yao, 2007). In contrast, the renter spends a fraction 
 0,1   of the home value in rent. Therefore   11 tPH   is the revenue from home selling net of 
transaction costs, tPH  is the cost of home purchase, tPH  is the home maintenance cost, 
 1 tP H   is the rent cost, and 1tY   is next year’s income. 
The evolution of liquid personal assets thus depends on the housing tenure decision. Four cases are 
possible: i) the agent rented and now rents  1 0t tH H   , in which case she pays rent costs P ; ii) 
the agent rented and now owns  1 0; 1t tH H   , in which case she pays the purchase price and 
maintenance costs P P  ; iii) the agent owned and now rents  1 1; 0t tH H   , in which case she 
pays rent costs and she gets revenues from home selling,  1P P    ; iv) the agent owned and 
now owns  1 1t tH H   , in which case she pays maintenance costs P . 
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2.2. Preferences 
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) build a theoretical framework for temptation and self-control motive, 
where agents have preferences not only over alternatives but also over sets of alternatives. They define 
as tempting those alternatives that are sub-optimal from a forward-looking perspective, but optimal 
from a myopic perspective. Using all available cash to fund immediate consumption is one possible 
tempting alternative. When making their decisions, agents face a utility cost to exert self-control and 
avoid tempting alternatives. In the framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), an agent may therefore 
prefer a given set of alternatives to another, larger set that includes the first set plus some tempting 
alternatives. Hence, the use of commitment devices that remove tempting alternatives from the choice 
set, may lead to an improvement in wellbeing. For instance in the context of consumption decisions, a 
retirement account is a commitment device because it results in a fraction of wealth being made 
unavailable for immediate consumption. Bucciol (2012) develops and simulates a temptation model 
with retirement accounts to estimate the degree of temptation. Our analysis derives from a variant of 
his framework that also includes housing assets.  
In a fashion similar to Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004), the uniperiodal utility function is defined as 
        * *1, , , , , , .t t t t t t t t t t tU C H S A H u C H v C H v C H     
Here  u   and  v   are two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and C* and H*are the choices 
corresponding to the maximum possible level of consumption. The first addend,  ,t tu C H , is the 
utility function as in standard models, while the second addend describes a temptation motive given by 
the difference between the utility under the tempting, myopic behaviour,  * *,t tv C H , and the utility 
reflecting the actual decisions,  ,t tv C H . For the sake of tractability we restrict our attention to the 
case where    v u   , with preference parameter 0  , the degree of temptation, measuring the agent’s 
sensitivity to the tempting alternative. Note that preferences are standard when 0  . The larger is  , 
the more temptation affects utility and so the stronger is the incentive to give in to temptation and to 
equalise consumption and cash-on-hand. 
The tempting, myopic behaviour makes the individual consume as much as possible at time t, leaving 
no wealth to future periods. Since the individual is borrowing constrained,1 consumption cannot exceed 
                                                            
1 Sophisticated credit instruments would change the details of the analysis somewhat, but realistic mortgage markets with 
both income-related and down-payment constraints (as modelled for instance in Attanasio et al., 2012), would not alter the 
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the portion of cash-on-hand available at the moment. The largest possible consumption is achieved 
only in the presence of: i) home renting rather than home ownership; ii) no contribution to retirement 
assets before retirement; iii) full withdrawal of retirement assets after retirement. Under this scenario we 
then have home renting, * 0tH  , no retirement asset contribution before retirement, * 0tX   if 
t K , full retirement asset withdrawal after retirement, *t tX A   if t K , and full consumption of 
all the liquid assets  * * 11t t t tC S X PH P      , in such a way that no personal assets are left 
for the future. 
The second addend of the above equation can also be seen as the cost of exerting self-control and 
resisting temptation. In order to increase her utility, an agent should reduce the cost of self-control. To 
achieve this an agent may tie her hands by making some choices (e.g., home ownership and investment 
in retirement assets) that reduce her future consumption choice set, an in particular lower the size (and 
utility benefit) of the tempting alternative. This means that temptation, and the desire to mitigate it, can 
be a motivation for owning illiquid assets and housing.  
It should be noticed, though, that while contributing to illiquid assets is possible at any time until 
retirement for any given amount (however small), housing purchase comes at a given cost that, due to 
borrowing constraints, can be afforded only when 1 0,tS    that is, when 
  11t t t t SS C X P Y R      . Hence housing is an actual option for commitment only when the 
individual has a relevant amount of liquid assets available. In a standard life-cycle model, and for many 
individuals, this typically happens in middle or old age. For an individual with self-control problems, 
however, holding a relatively large stock of liquid assets is costly. The only phase when this may happen 
is when retirement assets are no longer illiquid and can be freely withdrawn. 
The decision on the contribution to retirement assets is relevant for the immediate availability of 
savings for consumption and housing needs: only personal assets are immediately available, while 
retirement assets will be available only from age K. In this context, tempted individuals before 
retirement are more attracted by retirement assets than non-tempted individuals, because of their 
commitment role. After retirement these assets are no longer illiquid (they may be withdrawn at any 
convenience) and hence the desire to purchase commitment no longer provides any additional 
                                                            
model’s predictions as they would not undo the potential for housing to act as a commitment device. In her model with 
hyperbolic discounting, Ghent (2015) considers the possibility of foreclosure on loans. Foreclosure is almost unheard of in 
many European countries and in any case this possibility does not undermine housing’s role as a commitment device in 
Ghent’s model.   
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incentive for tempted individuals to hold them. After retirement, then, home ownership is the only 
viable commitment device. 
Agents’ intertemporal preferences at time t  are described by the following expected utility function: 
     1 1
1
, , , , , ,
T
k t
t t t t t t k k k k k
k t
U C H S A H E U C H S A H  
 
      
where   is the discount factor. For the sake of simplicity we omit potential bequest motives, which 
would not alter our qualitative conclusions. 
 
2.3. The optimisation problem 
We represent the agent’s optimisation problem using the recursive value function 
      1 1 1 1,, , max , , , , ,t tt t t t t t t t t t t tC XV S A H U C H S A H E V S A H         
subject to the above budget and borrowing constraints. The control variables of the problem are 
  1, , Tt t t tC X H  , and the state variables are  1 1, , , Tt t t tt S A H   . At any age t T , optimising behaviour 
(disregarding corner solutions) will satisfy the following system of two equations (see the appendix for 
their derivation), with  1 t K  an index function equal to 1 if t K  and 0 otherwise: 
     * *1 11 1
*
1 1
,, ,
1
t tt t t t
S t
t t t
u C Hu C H u C H
R E
C C C
 
  
 
         
 
         * * * *1 1 1 11 1 1 1* *
1 11 1
, ,, , .1 11
t t t tt t t t
A t S t
t tt t
u C H u C Hu C H u C H
R E t K R E
C CC C
 
 
      
  
                     
 
The first equation is the consumption Euler equation for tempted agents. In the case of no temptation 
( = 0) this equation becomes the familiar consumption Euler equation which can be interpreted as 
saying that the marginal cost of saving and giving up a unit of consumption in the current period, is set 
equal to the appropriately discounted expected marginal benefit of extra consumption next period. 
With positive , the equation illustrates that, for tempted individuals, the marginal cost of giving up one 
unit of current consumption must be set equal to this same marginal benefit minus the marginal cost of 
resisting additional temptation in the next period. Thus the marginal benefit of saving is smaller for 
tempted than for non-tempted individuals and this explains why, ceteris paribus, a tempted individual will 
consume more and save less than an otherwise identical non-tempted individual. The cost of resisting 
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additional temptation is partly mitigated when consumption is given up for the purchase of illiquid 
assets. In particular, neglecting cross-derivative effects, when a house is bought 1 1tH    and the 
marginal consumption benefit is larger in the next period. 
The second equation is the equation determining contributions to or withdrawals from the retirement 
asset. Notice that, after retirement, A SR R  and the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the 
equation coincide. This implies that a retired agent is completely indifferent between personal and 
retirement assets, as they are both liquid and provide the same return. This is not the case before 
retirement, when A SR R  and retirement assets are illiquid. We indeed see that the marginal cost of 
giving up one unit of future retirement savings must be equal to the marginal benefit of owning one 
unit of future personal savings minus the marginal cost of resisting the additional temptation in the next 
period. Hence, ceteris paribus, tempted individuals appreciate retirement assets more than non-tempted 
individuals do, because these assets provide commitment against the temptation to immediately 
consume all available resources. 
 
2.4. Predictions 
This stylised model thus predicts that tempted agents: 
i) Find it more difficult to accumulate personal savings (because they tend to consume all 
their wealth); 
ii) Are willing to save in illiquid assets (retirement assets and housing) rather than liquid assets 
(because illiquid assets provide commitment); 
iii) Are likely to save in retirement assets at an earlier stage than in housing (because liquidity 
constraints prevent home purchase at early ages); 
iv) Can save in commitment devices only through housing wealth after retirement (because 
retirement assets become liquid). 
The first two of these predictions can be seen by inspecting the Euler equations of the previous 
subsection; predictions (iii) and (iv) are consequences, or likely consequences, of realistic assumptions 
about credit constraints and the nature of the assets that are available and that provide commitment. 
Our claim in this paper is not that these insights are new ((i) and (ii) are certainly known consequences 
of the temptation model). Rather, the novelty of our exercise is to explore whether observed patterns 
of asset ownership and home purchase in micro data, are consistent with these implications of the 
model.  
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Figure 1 summarises a typical life-cycle pattern from this model. The agent starts her adult life without 
savings in liquid or illiquid assets. Then, as time goes by, she accumulates savings in the form of liquid 
wealth. Since this gives rise to self-control problems, the agent starts saving in liquid assets together 
with illiquid assets (that provide commitment). This happens since age A, when illiquid saving is made 
through the purchase of retirement assets. After a few further years, more liquid wealth is accumulated, 
again inducing self-control problems. However, this time the agent can afford the purchase of housing 
(at age B). The decision is motivated by the fact that the alternative option of saving in retirement 
assets will no longer provide commitment in a near future, when the agent becomes retired at age C. 
Turning to how we can compare the model’s prediction to the data, in a period of life when cash on 
hand is high (relative to permanent income), a tempted individual is likely to turn to financial 
commitment devices and subsequently (once credit constraints have been overcome) to invest in 
housing. Thus, for tempted individuals home ownership should: (a) be positively correlated with the 
holding of (illiquid financial) retirement assets; (b) follow the purchase of retirement assets. Our goal is 
to check if the data are consistent with these predictions. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3. The Data 
Our main source of micro data is SHARELIFE, the third wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), that asks respondents aged 50 and over to record life-history events 
regarding housing, health, children, relationships, employment and financial investments. For our 
purposes, information on previous investments in retirement accounts and life insurance policies (i.e., 
illiquid financial assets)2, as well on the year in which assets were first owned, is particularly important. 
SHARE respondents are a representative sample of the 50+ population in thirteen European countries; 
however, we exclude Poland from the analysis because of unreliable retrospective information on 
income3. Information from SHARELIFE is merged with information on current income and education 
from the second wave of SHARE (we consider the average over the 5 “constructed variables” 
imputations – see Christelis, 2011, for details on the multiple imputations methodology used in 
SHARE), and with permanent income estimates from Weiss (2012).  
                                                            
2 We also consider life insurance policies as illiquid financial assets. In many policies savings cannot be withdrawn for several 
years, or they can be withdrawn after paying large penalties. 
3 Trevisan et al. (2011) argue that Poles answering the SHARE questionnaire got confused between new and old Zloty 
around the devaluation in 1995 and misreported earnings during the high inflation of the 80s and 90s. 
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We reshape SHARELIFE as a longitudinal dataset, that is, for each respondent we have as many 
observations as years of adult age. By “adult age” we mean any age between the age in which the 
individual became independent (when she started to live on her own or when she established her own 
household) and the age in the year before the interview, with a minimum at age 19 and a maximum at 
age 80. Our dependent variable is the dummy variable “owner”, taking the value 1 if the individual is 
home-owner at a given age, and 0 otherwise. We include in the sample all observations from individuals 
who have never been home-owners (for whom the variable “owner” is equal to 0 at all ages), and, for 
individuals who have owned their home, all observations up to the age at which the home-ownership 
first occurred (thus for these observations the variable “owner” is equal to 0 at all ages but the last one). 
We can therefore estimate duration models on the timing of the first home purchase. 
Table 1 reports the definition of all the variables used in this analysis. The variables in the specification 
can be thought of as falling into five groups: financial ones (illiquid assets, i.e., life insurance policies 
and retirement accounts, and risk tolerance4), demographics (age, gender, education, health status), 
household composition (marital status, number of children, household size), occupation and income 
(unemployment, retired, permanent income), and finally control variables (country, cohort). To avoid 
potential simultaneity between home ownership and the other dimensions of the analysis, we take lags 
of time-varying explanatory variables. This means, for instance, that we relate home ownership in year 
t  to household size in year 1t   (rather than household size in year t , which might be affected by 
home ownership in year t ). For the ownership of illiquid assets, we take the second lag (i.e., the value 
in year 2t  ) because the purchase of a house is often associated to the holding of a life insurance 
policy. Alongside this indicator of ownership, we also include a measure of the number of years since 
illiquid assets were first owned, which might capture the time elapsed since commitment devices were 
first demanded. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Summary statistics on our variables are reported in Table 2, separately for the full sample and the sub-
sample of those who have ever owned illiquid assets. As expected, illiquid asset owners on average have 
                                                            
4 We use the self-assessed answer to a question on portfolio allocation between riskless and risky assets. Available options 
are: (1) Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns; (2) Take above average financial risks 
expecting to earn above average returns; (3) Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns; (4) Not willing 
to take any financial risks. Most answers are concentrated in option (4). The variable we include in the specification is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the individual declares to be willing to take at least some risk, i.e., if she reports any option between 
(1) and (3). 
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higher permanent income. On average they are also older, more highly educated and more likely to be 
males. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
4. Regression Analysis 
In this section we present our duration models of entry in to home-ownership. Using the data just 
described, we are able to control for many factors that are likely to influence house purchase choices 
and that may also be correlated with the decision to buy illiquid assets. In Subsection 4.1 we present 
duration models that control for a range of covariates. There may also be unobserved factors that could 
lead to a spurious correlation between the ownership of illiquid assets and house purchase, and so in 
subsection 4.2 we extend the model to also take account of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
4.1 Baseline Hazard Model 
Table 3 presents parameter estimates from a discrete duration model, estimated with a standard logit 
regression following Jenkins (1995). We always report average marginal effects multiplied by 100 to 
facilitate reading. Each number in the table can then be interpreted as the effect of a unit increase in the 
explanatory variable on the percentage probability of transiting into home-ownership in a given year. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Columns (1) to (3) of the table display the average marginal effects for the equation explaining the 
probability of first becoming a home-owner as a function of ownership of illiquid assets, controlling for 
risk attitude, age, gender, education, time-varying demographics (family size, marital status, number of 
children), employment status, income, country and cohort dummies. In particular, controlling for 
family composition is crucial to properly distinguish the temptation motive for first home purchase 
from the demographic motive (that relates the home purchase decision to variations in family size and 
composition). The three columns of Table 3 differ in their treatment of income, respectively current, 
permanent including pensions, and permanent excluding pensions. 
We see from column (1) that the coefficient on having illiquid assets is positive and significant: past 
illiquid asset holding is associated with an 0.549 percentage point increase in the probability of 
purchasing a house, in line with our expectations if consumers use illiquid assets as a commitment 
device to keep temptation under control. However, the longer the individual has had illiquid assets, the 
weaker the effect: in fact, one more year with illiquid assets reduces by 0.042 percentage points the 
probability to purchase a house, and so the sign is reversed about thirteen years (0.549/0.042) after 
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purchasing the asset. This suggests that tempted individuals with abundant cash on hand first buy 
commitment devices in the more easily accessible form of illiquid financial assets, and then also try to 
rapidly buy house. 
Not surprisingly, income has a strong, positive effect. In column (2) we replace the log of current 
income with the log of permanent income, computed only for employees as the discounted present 
value at age ten of all future earnings plus pension benefits5. This is a much more appropriate 
conditioning variable, as it captures long term differences in resources that should explain why people 
choose to purchase illiquid financial assets and to become home-owners. Permanent income indeed 
plays a strong role in explaining the transition into home-ownership, but the coefficients on the other 
variables of interest are fairly stable. 
In column (3) we focus on a narrower definition of permanent income that includes earnings but 
excludes pensions (as these may be in part affected by the decision to invest in individual retirement 
accounts). This measure also has the predicted, strong, positive coefficient, leaving little effect on the 
other coefficients. Thus a 1% increase in permanent income increases the probability of becoming a 
home-owner by 0.311 percentage points; holding illiquid assets increases the probability by more than 
half a percentage point, but this effect becomes null after more than twelve years of holding 
(0.580/0.047); finally, renters classified as risk tolerant are nearly one percent more likely to become 
home-owners in any given year than are those that are more averse to risk. The coefficients related to 
the other control variables have the expected sign. For instance, age follows the typical hump-shaped 
pattern, with the probability of purchasing a house increasing at young ages, reaching a maximum at age 
31 (0.247/(2*0.004)), and then falling. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
We conclude the section with Figure 2, a graphical representation of the hazard rates of home 
ownership, conditional on the holding, and non-holding, of non-liquid financial assets. The hazard rate 
of home ownership at age t can be computed as 
  1
1 exp
th t x
x 
     
  
                                                            
5  Permanent income is a measure of lifetime earnings at age ten, which is estimated controlling also for early life conditions, 
such as the occupation of the main breadwinner, the number of books, the number of rooms per person and the presence 
of facilities (such as central heating and hot running water) in the parental home. For details on how this measure was 
computed see Weiss (2012). 
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where x  is the set of averages of the explanatory variables (conditional on age=t), and   are the 
parameter estimates from the model using permanent income without pensions (column (3) of Table 
3). To compute the hazard rates conditional on holding (not holding) liquid assets, we set the relevant x 
variable equal to 1 (0). 6 Figure 2 plots the age profile of hazard rates over the full sample age range, 
showing a standard inverted-U shape peaking at around age 33, when family formation is underway. 
Importantly, hazard rates for households holding illiquid assets are persistently higher than hazard rates 
for households not holding them.  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The estimates presented above do not take into account the potential confounding effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the desire to resist temptation and/or have access to illiquid financial, or 
real, assets. It is possible that equally tempted individuals react differently to their temptation: some are 
more likely to lock themselves in IRAs, to later become home-owners (as a way to have a guaranteed 
stream of housing consumption services for the rest of their lives); others instead cannot do so, because 
this form of financial investment is not available to them, or will not do so because they do not value 
future consumption enough (they are not only tempted, but also highly impatient). In short, our 
previous findings might result from a selection bias due to unobserved factors that influence the 
probability to own both illiquid financial assets and a house. Ignoring this unobserved heterogeneity 
might have resulted in a spurious correlation between the decision to own illiquid financial assets and 
the decision to purchase a house.  
The empirical technique that we use to control for unobserved heterogeneity is one that has recently 
been used in the context of drug use. There the question of substance is whether the strong cross-
sectional association between cannabis use and hard drugs use is spurious and due to some innate 
personality trait (frailty) or instead one can identify a “gateway effect” whereby cannabis is a stepping 
stone for hard drugs. As with all analogies, the parallel between the drug use example and our case, is 
imperfect: in the drug use case one can readily think of mechanisms (exposure to dealers, peer-pressure 
from other users) for a direct gateway effect. What the two cases share is a concern that unobserved 
heterogeneity may skew the coefficients of interest in the duration analysis. In our illiquid assets and 
                                                            
6 Thus the two curves in the figure are calculated at the sample average of the explanatory variables, and differ only in the 
assumption on the holdings of illiquid assets. For the curve with assets, we set to 1 the variable on “Illiquid assets (t-2)”; 
for the curve without assets, we set to 0 the variable on “Illiquid assets (t-2)” and, for coherence, in this case we also set to 
0 the variable on “Years illiquid assets”. 
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home-ownership case, problems would arise if some “frailty” (thriftiness or impatience, for example) 
that is not controlled for by our list of regressors, means that some individuals are more likely to buy 
both illiquid financial, and real, assets. Thus, if our results are robust to controlling for heterogeneity 
that will increase our confidence in the idea that the link between purchasing illiquid financial assets and 
home-ownership is coming from the purchase of illiquid financial assets being an indicator that an 
individual feels it is a good time to buy commitment.  
Both van Ours (2003) and Melberg et al. (2010) tackle the issue of separating the “gateway effect” from 
the effect of frailty, by specifying a latent class model where the hazard of using hard drugs is affected 
by previous use of cannabis, but some or all estimated parameters can differ across endogenously 
determined groups of the population. The estimates of the coefficients of interest change when 
heterogeneity can play a role, and this allows the identification of what part of correlation between the 
use of cannabis and of harder drugs is due to unobserved heterogeneity, and what part instead can be 
interpreted as the causal (gateway) effect. Typically, this analysis highlights the presence of two such 
groups, one of which appears more prone to using drugs, the other more resistant.   
In our regressions, we adopt the more general approach taken by Melberg et al. (2010), whereby all 
parameters entering the model are allowed to vary across the two groups. Like those authors, we use 
the bivariate mixed proportional hazard model with shared frailty introduced in Abbring and Van Den 
Berg (2003). The model is made of two logistic regression equations, describing the outcome and 
treatment variables. In our case the treatment is the ownership of illiquid assets (life insurance policies 
or retirement accounts), while the outcome is home ownership. This model allows us to estimate how 
the probability of becoming a home-owner changes with and without the holding of illiquid assets in 
two groups, identified via variation in the timing of first investment in housing and in  illiquid assets. 
Specifically, we estimate the posterior probability that each observation belongs to either group. The 
average estimated probability of belonging to Group 1 is 45.9%, with most probabilities close to either 
0 or 1. In Table 4 we report summary statistics for all variables, weighted by the predicted probability of 
belonging to each group. The number of observations differs in the two groups because of the 
exclusion of observations with probability equal to 0. 
The last column of the table reports the outcome of a t-test on the equality of the mean in the two 
groups. Due to the large sample size, we reject this hypothesis in almost all the variables. The table 
shows that the second group is generally less wealthy (9.5% lower permanent income) and less highly 
educated, possibly because it was born during the Great Depression or during World War II (years 
1925-1944). The different availability of resources, and therefore access to credit, is reflected in more 
widespread holding of illiquid assets in the first group (26% as opposed to 14%). However, there is no 
17 
 
difference in the fraction of home purchases (3.5% in both groups) and the time lag between the first 
purchase of illiquid assets and housing is smaller in the second group (2 rather than 4.8 years).  
All in all, we may think of Group 2 as the group that is more prone to buy real assets: limited monetary 
resources notwithstanding, Group 2 is willing to purchase a house at the same rate as the better-off 
Group 1. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 shows the average marginal effects (multiplied by 100) of our regression analysis with 
unobserved heterogeneity. In column (2) we report the effects corresponding to the no heterogeneity 
model already presented in column (3) in Table 3. Column (1) does the same for the equation 
predicting the probability of becoming the owner of illiquid assets. The estimated effects of permanent 
income and risk tolerance on this dependent variable are large and significant. The model without 
unobserved heterogeneity in columns (1) and (2) provides a reference for our subsequent analysis. 
Columns (3) and (4) present the same effects computed using as weights the probabilities of belonging 
to Group 1. Columns (5) and (6) use instead the probability of belonging to Group 2. It is worth 
stressing that a different pair of logistic regressions is estimated across the two groups, and that each 
individual in the sample can belong to either one group or both, depending on the predicted 
probabilities that generate the individual weights in the logistic regressions. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature in the regressions on the purchase of illiquid assets is the huge 
difference between the estimated effect of permanent income and risk tolerance: when no 
heterogeneity is allowed, these effects are larger than when unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for. 
Similarly, the impact of illiquid asset holding on the probability to purchase a home is more than 
doubled when unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for. The remaining estimated marginal effects are 
not much affected by allowance for unobserved heterogeneity, with the possible exception that for 
Group 2 the probability of becoming a home-owner is more strongly affected by illiquid asset holding 
(1.58 as opposed to 1.21%.) This is clear also in Figure 3, which reports for the two groups the age 
profile of the hazard rate to purchase a house computed exactly as in Figure 2. The difference in hazard 
rates between illiquid asset owners and non-owners is much more marked in Group 2 (panel b) than in 
Group 1 (panel a). In both groups, however, the difference in hazard rates is more ample than 
predicted by the model without unobserved heterogeneity. 
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
For Group 2, the probability of becoming a home-owner also seems unaffected by family status and 
family composition, employment and health conditions. This pattern of coefficients seems in line with 
an explanation that focuses on limited access to illiquid financial investment for Group 2 individuals – 
and differences in access to financial markets that are correlated with income could also explain why 
permanent income effects are so different across columns (1), (3) and (5) in  Table 5.  
For our purposes, the key message of the analyses presented in this section is that controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity does not undermine the result that the in the years after purchasing illiquid 
financial assets households have an increased risk of becoming first-time house buyers. Indeed, as is 
clearly illustrated by the comparison of Figures 2 and 3, point estimates of the association between the 
ownership of illiquid financial assets and the likelihood of becoming a home owner, actually increase (in 
both groups 1 and 2) when we control for unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have used individual life-history data from twelve European countries, and duration 
analysis that controls for unobserved heterogeneity, to investigate whether observed patterns of 
investment in illiquid assets and housing are consistent with predictions based on “temptation 
preferences”.  
The illustrative model that we considered (Section 2) takes into account the standard motives for saving 
and investing in illiquid assets such as housing or retirement accounts, and also adds a “temptation 
motive” (à la Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004). The equations of the model make it clear why illiquid 
assets may be used by individuals who find it hard to resist the temptation presented by a large stock of 
accessible “cash on hand”. Particularly in the absence of other appropriate assets, for example as 
pensions approach the decumulation phase, housing may be the only asset that provides this 
commitment technology.  
The prima facie evidence we produced is consistent with the notion that, when tempted individuals 
first resort to illiquid financial assets to control temptation, they are then more likely to use housing as a 
commitment device. Our estimates also suggest that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the access to 
illiquid financial investment prior to home purchase. This may reflect institutional features of this 
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specific type of financial market, or more broadly different access to credit across Europe at different 
points in time.  
The analysis we presented in this paper is suggestive, but tentative. A structural model is necessary to 
better investigate the commitment effect of the temptation preferences as opposed to limited access to 
financial markets, credit constraints or other reasons (e.g., strategic interactions between non-
cooperative family members) that may induce a fraction of individuals to purchase their home soon 
after locking assets away in illiquid financial assets. This is left for future research. 
 
 
Appendix: Solution to the Life-cycle Problem 
The model solution is derived as follows. We derive the value function with respect to the choice 
variables tC  and tX  (first-order conditions) and the state variables tS  and tA  (envelope conditions). 
Manipulating the four conditions we find an expression for the first-order conditions of tC  and tX  
that does not involve the derivative of the value function. Finally, housing tenure tH  is chosen from 
the maximisation of the value function in the two alternative cases where 0tH   or 1tH  . 
To derive the system of equations, we compute the first-order conditions of  1, ,t t tV S A H   
with respect to tC  and tX : 
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We then use the envelope theorem and derive  1, ,t t tV S A H   with respect to tS  and tA : 
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Using (1) and (3), we find that 
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Furthermore, subtracting (3) from (4) and using (2), 
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Plugging (5) into (6) yields 
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Hence we can use (5) and (7) to rewrite the first-order conditions (1) and (2) as follows: 
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Now, because 
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we can rewrite equations (8) as 
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and equation (9) as 
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     (13) 
if t K . We can further simplify Equations (11)-(13) dividing by  1  , to obtain the equations 
shown in the main text. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variables Meaning 
Dependent  
Owner Dummy =1 if home owner, =0 otherwise
 
Financial 
 
Illiquid assets Dummy =1 if owner of illiquid assets (life insurance and /or retirement accounts) , =0 
otherwise 
Illiquid assets (t-2) Dummy =1 if held illiquid assets (life insurance or retirement accounts) two years before, 
=0 otherwise 
Years illiquid assets Years (≥2) since first holding of illiquid assets
Risk tolerant Dummy =1 if risk lover (categories 1-3 in question as068_, wave 2) 
 
Demographic 
 
Age Age 
Age2 Age squared 
Female Dummy =1 if female, =0 otherwise
High school Dummy =1 if high school degree at most, =0 otherwise [from SHARE] 
College Dummy =1 if college degree at most, =0 otherwise [from SHARE] 
Poor health (t-1) Dummy =1 if poor health status one year before, =0 otherwise 
 
Household composition 
 
Household size (t-1) Household size one year before
One child (t-1) Dummy =1 if had one child one year before, =0 otherwise
Two children (t-1) Dummy=1 if had two children one year before, =0 otherwise 
Three or more children (t-1) Dummy=1 if had three or more children one year before, =0 otherwise 
Partner (t-1) Dummy =1 if with a partner one year before, =0 otherwise
Widow (t-1) Dummy =1 if widow one year before, =0 otherwise
Divorced (t-1) Dummy =1 if divorced one year before, =0 otherwise
 
Occupation and income 
 
Unemployed (t-1) Dummy =1 if unemployed one year before, =0 otherwise
Retired (t-1) Dummy =1 if retired one year before, =0 otherwise
Log current income Logarithm of household total net income, corrected for PPP-adjusted exchange rate [from 
SHARE] 
Log permanent income Logarithm of lifetime earnings estimate as of age ten, for the head and the partner (excluding 
self-employed workers) 
Log permanent income 
   (excluding pensions) 
Logarithm of lifetime earnings estimate as of age ten, for the head and the partner, net of 
pensions (excluding self-employed workers) 
 
Control 
 
Country: X Dummy =1 if country X, =0 otherwise (baseline is Germany)
Cohort: 19YY Dummy =1 if born in years 19YY-4 – 19YY, =0 otherwise (baseline is years 1945-1949)
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Table 2. Summary statistics (N=261,227) 
 
All 
(N=261,227) 
Illiquid assets owners 
(N=59,585) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Owner 0.035 0.183 0.044 0.205 
Illiquid assets (t-2) 0.195 0.397 0.886 0.317 
Years of illiquid assets 3.310 8.717 15.001 12.961 
Risk tolerant 0.254 0.435 0.315 0.465 
Age 40.594 14.165 45.723 13.914 
Age2 1,848.544 1,297.585 2,284.231 1,328.574 
Female 0.556 0.497 0.461 0.498 
High school 0.340 0.474 0.405 0.491 
College 0.190 0.392 0.231 0.421 
Poor health (t-1) 0.062 0.242 0.090 0.286 
Household size (t-1) 3.008 1.439 2.988 1.367 
One child (t-1) 0.230 0.421 0.226 0.418 
Two children (t-1) 0.300 0.458 0.339 0.473 
Three or more children (t-1) 0.073 0.260 0.075 0.263 
Partner (t-1) 0.796 0.403 0.816 0.387 
Widow (t-1) 0.029 0.168 0.033 0.179 
Divorced (t-1) 0.022 0.146 0.026 0.159 
Unemployed (t-1) 0.013 0.112 0.014 0.118 
Retired (t-1) 0.100 0.299 0.140 0.347 
Log permanent income 
   (excluding pensions) 
8.587 1.120 8.923 0.315 
Country: Austria 0.039 0.193 0.036 0.187 
Country: Belgium 0.095 0.294 0.106 0.308 
Country: Czech Republic 0.117 0.321 0.081 0.273 
Country: Denmark 0.083 0.275 0.110 0.312 
Country: France 0.114 0.318 0.083 0.276 
Country: Greece 0.047 0.212 0.004 0.066 
Country: Italy 0.080 0.271 0.023 0.149 
Country: Netherlands 0.111 0.314 0.119 0.324 
Country: Spain 0.034 0.182 0.011 0.104 
Country: Sweden 0.076 0.264 0.101 0.302 
Country: Switzerland 0.090 0.286 0.134 0.340 
Cohort: 1919 0.017 0.130 0.007 0.086 
Cohort: 1924 0.049 0.216 0.035 0.184 
Cohort: 1929 0.091 0.288 0.069 0.254 
Cohort: 1934 0.132 0.338 0.123 0.328 
Cohort: 1939 0.154 0.361 0.156 0.362 
Cohort: 1944 0.174 0.379 0.184 0.387 
Cohort: 1954 0.145 0.352 0.161 0.368 
Cohort: 1959 0.067 0.249 0.072 0.259 
Note. Illiquid asset owners refer to the sub-sample of individuals who held illiquid financial assets at least at some point in their life. 
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Table 3. Rent-Own transitions: model without unobserved heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Illiquid assets (t-2) 0.549*** 0.593*** 0.580*** 
 (0.130) (0.145) (0.146) 
Years illiquid assets -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Risk tolerant 0.691*** 0.791*** 0.815*** 
 (0.072) (0.079) (0.080) 
Age 0.218*** 0.234*** 0.247*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) 
Age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.166*** -0.043 -0.022 
 (0.064) (0.073) (0.075) 
High school 0.410*** 0.546*** 0.561*** 
 (0.079) (0.088) (0.089) 
College 0.817*** 1.007*** 1.035*** 
 (0.089) (0.097) (0.098) 
Poor health (t-1) -0.494*** -0.637*** -0.612*** 
 (0.171) (0.198) (0.201) 
Household size (t-1) 0.017 0.002 0.008 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.043) 
One child (t-1) 0.374*** 0.369*** 0.330*** 
 (0.082) (0.092) (0.093) 
Two children (t-1) 0.251*** 0.185* 0.179* 
 (0.087) (0.100) (0.102) 
Three children (t-1) -0.501*** -0.407* -0.406* 
 (0.185) (0.217) (0.222) 
Partner (t-1) 1.874*** 2.021*** 2.068*** 
 (0.124) (0.137) (0.139) 
Widow (t-1) 0.937*** 1.132*** 1.094*** 
 (0.345) (0.405) (0.419) 
Divorced (t-1) 0.141 0.002 0.055 
 (0.330) (0.368) (0.369) 
Unemployed (t-1) -0.973*** -0.931*** -0.922** 
 (0.336) (0.361) (0.363) 
Retired (t-1) 0.285 0.320 0.475* 
 (0.229) (0.257) (0.265) 
Log current income 0.494***   
 (0.043)   
Log permanent income  0.446***  
  (0.056)  
Log permanent income   0.312*** 
   (excluding pensions)   (0.041) 
    
Country effects YES YES YES 
Cohort effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 335,436 268,136 261,227 
Log-likelihood -46,743.732 -37,923.715  -37,026.969 
McFadden’s R2 0.058 0.061 0.062 
Note. The table reports 100 times the average marginal effects from univariate probit models. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
household purchases a house for the first time. Column (1): we exclude observations reporting no income. Columns (2)-(3): we exclude observations 
on self-employed workers (8.89% of the respondents) as well as the top and bottom 1% of the permanent income estimates. Standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Model with unobserved heterogeneity: mean of the two groups 
Variable Group 1 Group 2 Difference
Owner 0.035 0.035 0.000 
Illiquid assets (t-2) 0.261 0.140 0.120*** 
Years of illiquid assets 4.800 2.049 2.750*** 
Risk tolerant 0.262 0.247 0.015*** 
Age 40.295 40.848 -0.553*** 
Age2 1,817.534 1,874.788 -57.254*** 
Female 0.538 0.571 -0.033*** 
High school 0.349 0.332 0.017*** 
College 0.204 0.178 0.026*** 
Poor health (t-1) 0.065 0.061 0.004*** 
Household size (t-1) 2.984 3.029 -0.045*** 
One child (t-1) 0.225 0.235 -0.010*** 
Two children (t-1) 0.303 0.297 0.006*** 
Three or more children (t-1) 0.064 0.080 -0.016*** 
Partner (t-1) 0.799 0.794 0.005*** 
Widow (t-1) 0.025 0.032 -0.007*** 
Divorced (t-1) 0.022 0.022 0.001 
Unemployed (t-1) 0.015 0.011 0.005*** 
Retired (t-1) 0.092 0.106 -0.013*** 
Log permanent income
   (excluding pensions) 
8.636 8.545 0.009*** 
Country: Austria 0.035 0.041 -0.006*** 
Country: Belgium 0.095 0.096 -0.001 
Country: Czech Republic 0.113 0.120 -0.007*** 
Country: Denmark 0.088 0.078 0.010*** 
Country: France 0.104 0.123 -0.019*** 
Country: Greece 0.075 0.023 0.052*** 
Country: Italy 0.068 0.089 -0.021*** 
Country: Netherlands 0.106 0.115 -0.009*** 
Country: Spain 0.025 0.042 -0.017*** 
Country: Sweden 0.078 0.074 0.004*** 
Country: Switzerland 0.091 0.089 0.002*** 
Cohort: 1919 0.031 0.006 0.025*** 
Cohort: 1924 0.085 0.019 0.065*** 
Cohort: 1929 0.045 0.131 -0.086*** 
Cohort: 1934 0.085 0.171 -0.087*** 
Cohort: 1939 0.118 0.184 -0.066*** 
Cohort: 1944 0.138 0.204 -0.066*** 
Cohort: 1954 0.209 0.091 0.118*** 
Cohort: 1959 0.052 0.079 -0.027*** 
 
Observations 204,939 172,314  
Note. The last column reports the result of a t-test on the equality of the means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Model with unobserved heterogeneity 
 No heterogeneity Heterogeneity, group 1 Heterogeneity, group 2 
VARIABLES (1) 
Illiquid 
assets 
(2) 
Home-
Ownership 
(3) 
Illiquid 
assets 
(4) 
Home-
Ownership 
(5) 
Illiquid 
assets 
(6) 
Home-
Ownership 
       
Illiquid assets (t-2)  0.580***  1.210***  1.577*** 
  (0.146)  (0.219)  (0.241) 
Years illiquid assets  -0.047***  -0.021*  -0.074*** 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
Risk tolerant 3.146*** 0.815*** 0.820*** 0.954*** 0.560*** 0.721*** 
 (0.169) (0.080) (0.157) (0.111) (0.125) (0.106) 
Age 2.232*** 0.247*** 0.360*** 0.244*** 0.888*** 0.243*** 
 (0.039) (0.025) (0.048) (0.036) (0.029) (0.032) 
Age2 -0.017*** -0.004*** 0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -7.248*** -0.022 -3.541*** 0.095 -2.283*** -0.126 
 (0.153) (0.075) (0.145) (0.103) (0.113) (0.097) 
High school 3.068*** 0.561*** 0.895*** 0.648*** 0.859*** 0.488*** 
 (0.179) (0.089) (0.174) (0.125) (0.128) (0.114) 
College 3.164*** 1.035*** 1.777*** 1.222*** 0.561*** 0.888*** 
 (0.213) (0.098) (0.196) (0.137) (0.162) (0.130) 
Poor health (t-1) 1.303*** -0.612*** 0.470 -0.924*** 0.584*** -0.316 
 (0.284) (0.201) (0.286) (0.290) (0.201) (0.270) 
Household size (t-1) -0.281*** 0.008 0.694*** -0.078 -0.456*** 0.077 
 (0.077) (0.043) (0.077) (0.063) (0.060) (0.053) 
One child (t-1) 1.603*** 0.330*** 0.325* 0.469*** 1.584*** 0.188 
 (0.204) (0.093) (0.191) (0.129) (0.148) (0.120) 
Two children (t-1) 1.673*** 0.179* 0.566*** 0.323** 1.596*** 0.060 
 (0.194) (0.102) (0.190) (0.146) (0.143) (0.131) 
Three children (t-1) -0.894** -0.406* -4.021*** -0.475 -0.655** -0.417 
 (0.360) (0.222) (0.362) (0.351) (0.311) (0.272) 
Partner (t-1) 4.516*** 2.068*** 1.934*** 2.202*** 2.320*** 1.967*** 
 (0.263) (0.139) (0.252) (0.191) (0.189) (0.176) 
Widow (t-1) 4.855*** 1.094*** 0.807 1.608*** 2.713*** 0.806 
 (0.482) (0.419) (0.610) (0.613) (0.384) (0.542) 
Divorced (t-1) 1.896*** 0.055 2.345*** -0.371 0.866** 0.390 
 (0.511) (0.369) (0.522) (0.549) (0.348) (0.474) 
Unemployed (t-1) -5.572*** -0.922** -0.586 -0.986** -1.896*** -0.837* 
 (0.645) (0.363) (0.626) (0.465) (0.459) (0.505) 
Retired (t-1) 1.235*** 0.475* 1.814*** 0.781** -0.976*** 0.154 
 (0.336) (0.265) (0.354) (0.364) (0.239) (0.360) 
Log permanent income 3.227*** 0.312*** 1.043*** 0.233*** 0.866*** 0.369*** 
   (excluding pensions) (0.091) (0.041) (0.085) (0.058) (0.070) (0.053) 
       
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 261,227 261,227 204,939 204,939 172,314 172,314 
Log-likelihood -11,5005.14 -37,026.969 -22,619.156 -16,980.863 -20,344.623 -19,942.656  
McFadden’s R2 0.164 0.062 0.686 0.063 0.674 0.066 
Note. The table reports 100 times the average marginal effects from the bivariate mixed proportional hazard analysis on the holding of illiquid 
assets and home ownership, unweighted (Columns (1)-(2)), and weighted, using as weights the probability to belong to group 1 (Columns (3)-(4)) 
or group 2 (Columns (5)-(6)). The full regression output is reported in the Appendix Table A3. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Liquid and illiquid wealth allocation in a life-cycle model with temptation 
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Figure 2. Hazard of home ownership (without unobserved heterogeneity) 
 
 
Note. Hazard rates are estimated from Table 3, Column (3). 
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Figure 3. Hazard of homeownership (with unobserved heterogeneity) 
 
a) Group 1 
 
 
b) Group 2 
 
Note. Hazard rates are estimated from Table 5, Column (4) for panel a) and Column (6) for panel b). 
 
